社会工作与管理 ›› 2018, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (6): 80-84.

• 社科探索 • 上一篇    下一篇

在职培训劳资利益均衡的实现过程与条件

王明亮, 刘三林   

  1. 广东工业大学经济与贸易学院, 广东 广州, 510520
  • 收稿日期:2018-03-28 出版日期:2018-11-15 发布日期:2018-11-15
  • 作者简介:王明亮(1969-),男,汉族,教授,博士;主要研究方向:合作创新治理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目“非典型雇佣模式下的合作创新治理研究”(71673061);广东省自然科学基金项目“新型城镇化背景下的广东劳资关系演化与优化问题研究”(2015A030313496);广东省哲学社会科学“十三五“规划项目“产业升级驱动下珠三角农民工职业技能提升机制研究:在职培训视角”(GD16CYJ04)。

On the Process and Conditions for the Benefit Balance between Labor and Capital in In-service Training

WANG Mingliang, LIU Sanlin   

  1. School of Economics and Commerce, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangdong Guangzhou, 510520, China
  • Received:2018-03-28 Online:2018-11-15 Published:2018-11-15

摘要: 以探讨在职培训实现劳资利益均衡的过程与条件为目的,分析了劳资在职培训博弈问题的复杂性,给出了劳资在职培训非对称演化博弈模型,并结合我国实际进行了演化路径及其实现条件的分析。劳资在职培训博弈是否最终能够演化为社会所期望的“企业投资,员工合作”局面,取决于对员工在职培训完成后“不合作”行为的有效惩罚力度、在职培训双方收益分配比例以及雇佣关系的维系成本三个关键因素的优化协整。

关键词: 在职培训, 复杂性, 演化稳定策略, 演化路径

Abstract: With a purpose of discussing the process and conditions for in-service training to achieve the balance of benefits between labor and capital, this paper analyzes the complexity of gaming between labor and capital in in-service training, and offers an asymmetric evolutionary game model for the labor and capital in in-service training. Combined with the realities of China, it also conducts an analysis of the evolutionary path and conditions for its realization. Whether the gaming between labor and capital in in-service training can reach the expected scenario of "investment from enterprises and cooperation from employees", it is related with the optimization and co-integration of three key elements, which are effective penalty on "uncooperative" behaviors from the employees after the completion of in-service training, the proportion of income distribution between the labor and capital and maintenance cost for the employment relationship.

Key words: in-service training, complexity, evolutionary stable strategy, evolution path

中图分类号: 

  • F246
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